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Alessandro Armando. I will try to frame a bit the topic 
that Giovanni Durbiano and I are writing about. Leonardo 
Caffo is our critical reader, who is a student of  Maurizio 
Ferraris, and together we are trying to construct a dialogue. 
We would like to engage with a problem that has to do with 
what we talked about earlier, namely the urban crisis and the 
“meltdown” – that even in our Turin context we have heard 
a lot about in recent years. 
The city has almost stopped; there is some frustration in 
terms of  the capacity of  architects and the administration to 
have an effect on the collective city and on public space. In 
this work, we would like to deal with the effects of  architec-
tural design. To do so, we are trying to put up for discussion 
and recuperate the “forefathers,” such as Gabetti and Isola, 
who are kind of  the architecture references in Turin, they 
were our teachers, and they fixed the standpoint on the project 
(and therefore also on the theory of  architectural design) and 
whom we cannot overlook, from the outset. Then, of  course, 
it seems inevitable to criticize these things. In particular, the 
figure of  architect designer for Gabetti is closely linked to an 
idea of   the presence and authenticity of  a subject, who is able 
to take responsibility to face conditions of  reality and recom-
pose them in his own project and within his own competence. 
In our view, however, this attitude clashes with the conditions 
in which we are working (and we surely do not have the stat-
ure of  Gabetti), in light of  the fact that often projects have 
no effect, and with the problem that the authenticity of  the 
designer does not guarantee getting to the heart of  a process: 
the mayor who is opposed, competitions that are not complet-
ed... Despite the effort that can be exerted studying a project 
with the utmost concentration and intention, especially when 
confronted with open contexts (the collective dimension of  
the city), almost always the opportunity for the architect to 
guide the project is distorted or fails. Often we architects do 
not get to the end of  the game, aside from a few (and my 
view has a tone of  frustration, so I would even go further).
The architect’s theoretical work can bring problems to 
light, for example, with regard to the assumption that a theory 
“of  architecture” can be concerned with the best architecture 
and the best of  all possible worlds we want to accomplish. 
The theory “of  the project” can be concerned with other 
things: for example, it could be concerned with the project as 
the best possible “effects,” the most extensive of  the possible 
effects; in short, it might be worried about the performativity 
of  projects, and this moves quite a bit the axis of  the problem.
The architect is the one who produces the projects. To be 
one who produces projects is different than making buildings; 
the architect will always do the things that separate him from 
the artifact. The distinction between the production of  a pro-
ject and the production of  a building artifact involves a series 
of  differences. One of  these is that when I produce a project, 
and I do not build things, in reality I am posing a problem, I 
am using an epistemic model that is “prospective,” looking 
forward to the things that are not there yet. Meanwhile, if  I am 
the anthropologist or historian, I have a “retrospective” model, 
I look at the things that have already happened and that already 
exist or have already existed (including buildings). Thus, in one 
case demonstrated, in the other promised: when I do a project, 
I make a promise. This means that all orders of  truth and real-
ity are overturned with respect to other disciplines, which are 
also the strongest methodologically in the humanities. 
In Turin, Carlo Olmo and historians have taught us to 
“discipline” many orders of  questions, which are however in-
evitably retrospective in nature, coming from human sciences 
as sciences of  description; we ourselves do not have so much 
to do with description, we have much more to do with the 
promise and with prescription. From here comes out another 
question, in the sense that obviously prescription is not only a 
persuasive way of  convincing others, but also a way to “obli-
gate” others, and if  we had no obligations on our side, in our 
business we would not have any power. If  we are not able to 
bring a project to approval – and thus we do not transform 
an idea into a series of  strongly binding documents – we have 
not produced any effect (this is also a problem of  ethics), and 
we are also bad architects.
Thus, in models that are behind this “prescriptive func-
tionality” of  our profession, a whole other host of  issues 
are hidden: typically, behind the prescriptions lies a “linear 
model, “for which I tell you what you need to do (construc-
tion design) and you do exactly that, and in the end you get 
this result – otherwise if  you do not get it, you have not 
followed the project. Now, in reality, none of  the determining 
of  orders of  our work is done linearly, whereby the paradigm 
of  the diagram of  flow and of  the linear “program” is not 
realistic, because in the end the process is always divergent 
and undergoes deviations.
Now, all the work we do is produced by means of  doc-
uments: and it is here that our philosopher friends come to 
our assistance, and even to critique, because the problem of  
documents is very articulated. It is a problem that we have 
studied in our own way, to try to understand what feature this 
“document” had, because in effect the architect only produces 
documents (more or less paper). 
There is a first sphere, in which I do things on my own, 
then it widens out, and then it comes back to me. Thus cy-
clical conditions of  document exchange are created between 
the parties involved in the process that make this cloud of  
documents grow over time. If  I look retrospectively at a pro-
ject after it is completed, I can define a enormous amount of  
documents that I have produced; then if  I also add to that 
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the other spheres of  exchange that do not come directly from 
me, a giant map comes out, that tells me what I did and can 
reestablish a measurable form of  my work, within the general 
context. Obviously, it would be too little if  everything were 
reduced to the registration of  a single final trace that coincides 
with the “project image”: the cloud of  documents is yes, made 
of  designs, but also of  contracts, specifications, certifications 
etc. I can try to hypothesize about how these “clouds” devel-
op, I can come up with some correlation schemes and propose 
models which then are articulated over time.
There exist phases of  the exchange that we can intuitively 
imagine opening in terms of  “symbolic exchange,” in which 
more interlocutors need to be included, in such a way that 
the questions are registered in an order that must be stabi-
lized, through contractual points. The exchanges are of  dif-
ferent types: there are exchanges that are used to define the 
descriptions, and others that define the requirements. The 
narrative and symbolic dimension says how this future must 
be designed, while the prescriptive and “bureaucratic” one 
establishes the obliging conditions for such a future. The time 
in which this exchange is consumed will remain distinct from 
the lifetime of  a work – or at least anticipates the time in 
which the work is built and used. 
The symbolic exchanges must be fixed, and are recog-
nized systematically through formal acts (permits, author-
izations, certifications) that make up what we instead call 
“bureaucratic exchange.” There’s a whole network of  con-
straints that ensures that everything is instituted, at certain 
times even against the will of  individuals. 
There are procedures that have a degree of  automa-
tion such that at certain times any technical officer may be 
opposed, bureaucratically, to a possibly even important re-
consideration from a policy maker; these are the automatic 
effects of  certain processes, which are not attributable to the 
sphere of  the intention of  “free” subjects to decide what to 
do or not, but instead move forward on their behalf. Because 
there exists an order of  reality of  urban transformation that 
has its own autonomy, even if  not absolute: we, collectively, 
are the ones who produce these conditions, and then we do 
not know how to control them.
If  we imagine placing an approval step into this circle 
of  exchanges – a step in which I create a design and present 
it – I have to think that this presentation will be fixed and 
registered, and it will become the basis for passing to a fur-
ther detail, for defining boundaries, which then in the form 
of  a provision delimits real space, and so on. Then I generate 
competitions, bids, and in the end I build this “thing,” with-
out anyone having directly checked what form it has. It might 
be expected that the final effects that a project imagines in 
the beginning in reality is subjected to transformations over 
time that lead it to be completed, and that otherwise it would 
not reach completion.
Then there are a whole series of  considerations on the 
types of  models that we can construct to describe these pro-
cesses: they are representations that concern as much the sin-
gle document as the complete process. 
In the construction of  our hypothetical scheme of  pro-
cesses, we have to pass from a network of  simple corrections 
of  a structural nature to systems of  relations in which there 
is already a direction – so we are already in a series – up to 
the point of  designing a further specification of  networks, in 
which each of  these nodes could be a single document, which 
has an implicit process of  internal development: a generative 
scheme that is fixed in a certain design or authorization, and 
that then composes a system, legible in its final effects.
The fact that a project deviates is not necessarily a failure; 
it can be considered the way to connect further implications, 
further entities. If  we were able to design this architecture of  
implications, which is produced over time, we could consider 
the project a “technical object,” one that can be put into a 
perspective of  evolutionary deviation, in which the transfor-
mations can be represented in a diagram. 
I can undertake this kind of  reasoning at the scale of  the 
individual document, at the scale of  a building project, or at 
an urban scale (for example, considering a “executive planning 
instrument”). Each of  these scales of  deviation exist one in-
side the other: if  I as the designer must deal with the city, I 
have to ask myself  this question of  successive nesting, which 
given that they start from a documental record will never allow 
me to separate a visionary idea from the crude practice of  my 
bureaucratic being. Otherwise, I have to delegate the technical 
work to others, separating it from the “vision,” and therefore 
I would lose my professional identity.
All of  this carries behind it other, more complicated con-
siderations, which concern the problem of  “perspectivism”: 
if  a project effect depends on the fact that there has been an 
agreement, and this agreement has been approved by means 
of  a contract, we could say that the person who designs it is 
a “subject who grows conventionally.”
The more he/she grows, the more powerful he/she be-
comes; the more powerful, the more fragile though, such are 
the many orders of  constraints that he/she has generated. So, 
in this “collective subject,” unstable images of  the final stage 
of  the project are created, which are continually at risk of  
disappearing: we no longer have a single person like Gabetti 
who knew what he wanted and told others what to do. The 
subject, as an individual, advances by articulating a project 
and joins with an increasingly wide subjectivity, which goes 
beyond and which could fail at each step of  widening. The 
internal fragility of  this collective subject may even necessitate 
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something else beyond bureaucracy, and in fact needs some-
thing narrative, from a symbolic exchange, a weak device that 
holds together the parties of  this unfinished subject prior to 
the contract. It is perhaps the concept of  “storytelling” that 
we need, as it has been theorized by cognitive scientists, which 
defines storytelling as the means by which we build a common 
sense of  something that is not yet common. If  we ourselves 
analyze the dynamics between two members of  a studio (one 
who starts by making a proposal and the other who responds 
by objecting and deciding), we could probably represent the 
symbolic exchange in this way: a narrative launching point, 
an action that deviates, and a new narrative launching point, 
which in turn registers a point that becomes a first agreement: 
namely, the first collectivization of  the subject, from one to 
two. So, in this sense, the “narrator against the decision mak-
er” are integrated into a collective subject and establish the 
first order of  convention, which is however also an order of  
a “collectively registered intention.”
All of  this should end up somewhere, in the sense that on 
the one hand we would like to say, “Well, then we need to do 
projects in a different way,” but on the other hand we know 
very well that we are in the process of  systematizing practi-
cal questions, those already noted. Professionals are already 
acting in documental terms and by successive agreements, 
and work of  this kind can provide a frame of  reference for 
the pragmatic order within which the production of  projects 
is already happening. In addition, there are some suggestions 
that come to mind: for example, we would like to show that 
projects could be diachronic, that is, they could identify orders 
of  a concatenation of  effects not only morphological, but in 
their making. The way in which we build the image of  the 
project is instead always assimilable as a synchronic chart.
Leonardo Caffo. Something fairly taken for granted for 
you who have been involved with architecture, that for at least 
50-60 years the relationship between architecture and philoso-
phy has been very close and often has not lead anywhere, the 
most common notions that are often studied of  the philos-
ophers’ interaction between architecture and philosophy are 
those of  deconstruction, in which Jacques Derrida has been 
given weight and inserted into well-known architectural theory 
is that particular text titled “Maintenant, l’architecture” (Now, 
Architecture), in which he presents a series of  lessons on the 
subject and has often applied the theory of  deconstruction 
that meant something different entirely, and one proceeded 
to disassemble pieces of  that theory to see what to do with it 
in architecture. You all know how much has been speculated 
about the word “dwelling,” a reference to Martin heidegger, 
who often did not say anything interesting from an architec-
tural point of  view and was hyper-interpreted.
For philosophers, architecture is not preoccupied with 
what Alessandro Armando has just said, this is the interesting 
thing – philosophers for a long time thought that architecture 
should be concerned with the built, literally forgetting the 
project. Philosophers who deal with architecture deal with that 
which is called social reality. What comes out when philoso-
phers deal with social reality and look to architecture is that 
what we do not know is that 80% of  the built environment 
was completed without planning, and only 20% with planning. 
Max horkheimer called out the “mass misery” in the meta-
phor “skyscraper,” social housing “in India, China and Africa, 
the mass misery goes beyond all imagination, extended areas 
of  the Balkans are a torture chamber,” where buildings were 
made without planning.
With this book, I was able to finally figure out what the 
philosophy of  architecture is talking about. It is important 
to interpret the project as a document. Derrida’s metaphor 
returns, he is a very complicated philosopher; one of  the 
architects who understood him best was Eisenman, with 
whom he worked, and there is an anecdote in which Derrida 
tells Eisenman: “If  you keep interpreting me like that you 
will end up forgetting the windows.”
Derrida interprets the built and not only as a text, for 
which deconstruction was a textual practice, that is, to see 
what is left when the unnecessary is eliminated from the text, 
what happens when architecture is interpreted as a text and 
one tries to apply deconstruction to the text, the first thing 
that comes from it is that the project as a document brings 
out the notions of  traces, memory, and resistance, and one 
of  the best comparisons for all of  this is to bring to mind the 
novel On the Natural History of  Destruction by W. G. Sebald. This 
book traces the architectural metaphor of  the reconstruction 
of  Germany, in which there is an attempt to remove certain 
things that had been built within a certain period of  history in 
order to shift the sense of  guilt; according to Nietzsche, guilt 
is the structural construction of  a society.
Therefore, philosophy and architecture here begin a 
high-handed dialogue with each other; clearly philosophers 
should not be involved in building windows, but, if  we are 
talking about society, the word “to build” has at least one 
polysemy, a double semantics: on the one hand it means 
Alessandro’s work, and on the other it means my job. The 
reason why the project becomes interesting to me in a book 
like the one that Giovanni and Alessandro are writing, why 
there are so many philosophical notions that are often elusive 
and that thanks to the architecture take shape, it is good to 
begin to go from the philosophy of  architecture, which has 
often focused on the contingency of  architecture, from the 
aesthetics of  architecture (“Is architecture beautiful?” “Why 
are contemporary art museums more beautiful than the works 
inside?”), another typical theme is the ethics of  architecture 
300 PADIGLIONE ARChITETTuRA MCM ExPO BELLE ARTI
(“Is architecture responsible for what it does?”), it is neces-
sary to pass to philosophical architecture, which is an entirely 
different thing, where one does not speak about ethics or 
aesthetics, but of  the code of  conduct of  architecture, that is, 
what kind of  relationships are created between worlds within 
the project; something that immediately brings to mind the 
notion of  project as problematized by Alessandro, which is 
the notion of  reflective equilibrium. 
The notion of  reflective equilibrium is one of  the best 
concepts on the market of  contemporary moral philosophy; it 
has produced a philosopher called John Rawls who wrote the 
book A Theory of  Justice. The notion of  reflective equilibrium 
is the idea that societies arise to the extent that a group of  
people put their personal interests in brackets, and try in some 
way to abstract the categories, principles, and fundamental 
parameters of  human existence and create a contract between 
them, and they try to establish something, typically it is spo-
ken about on the level of  ignorance. The project then as it is 
problematized by them, there is a part of  the book in which 
they make a comparison between Leibnitz and Deleuze and 
in which there is the famous diagram of  the book on the Ba-
roque fold, in which Alexander has explained that the project 
eats the other points of  view, which I have seen as an agree-
ment of  points of  view. Thus, that particular 20% of  architec-
ture that has been left alone on the part of  philosophers was 
actually the most important thing, because it was the precise 
putting into practice of  this process of  contractualization that 
moral philosophy seeks to understand in the present day, that 
is, precisely when ones does something that makes you wants 
to go from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, wants to move from 
the inside to the outside, the project moves from the mind to 
the world, and to do that we must look to link the two things.
Another thing is that the action of  a project is some-
thing completely new compared to actions in the way that 
philosophers have always understood them; philosophers de-
fine actions as something different than a movement: action 
is something that is done with the intention of  reaching an 
objective, and if  the objective is reached with the initial inten-
tions, philosophers call these theoretical entities action – here 
is where the project completely breaks with this idea of  action 
as philosophers have traditionally defined it. 
The action of  a project is something that transcends 
the individual who is undertaking it, because there are those 
whole series of  processes seen before with Alexander, but 
also because there is an issue of  generations; we know well 
that if  architecture is text, is trace, is document, then archi-
tecture is memory to the extent that you do and you are doing 
something that will be interpreted by someone who is not 
here now, and if  it is found again and from there it will start 
off  again to do something else. The project as architecture 
is a relay race; it is done today so someone else has a part 
of  the world on which to interpret something that does not 
exist yet, and you will no longer be there to the extent that 
someone else will be interpreting it. here, this is architecture 
as resistance, as trace, and as memory, and the project is 
therefore something that is done in the hope that someone 
will resume from where you left off; here, this is architecture 
as humanity, that is, the idea that what you are doing will give 
meaning to the reality that someone will create later – the idea 
of  the continuation of  the species homo sapiens. The time has 
arrived to understand that interdisciplinarity is not just a word 
with which to obtain research funding, but the only hope of  
trying to understand that, to the extent in which a world is 
made, either it is done together or something is done that will 
not go well literally. Thus, the time has come to restructure 
the shelves of  contemporary bookstores, the time has come 
to not cling to the polysemy; if  I write a book on living; I 
am not necessarily saying anything useful for architects, and 
conversely if  I write Inside Out as a collection of  writings 
after so many years they are not necessarily interesting to a 
philosopher, because perchance I said something interesting, 
but I have not worked in that space. The research that you 
have heard now is that space, within which one becomes 
conscious that designing is doing something that has to do 
with the intrinsic and the extrinsic, one needs to have an idea 
of  humanity, an idea of   the future, one has to have an idea of  
progress, and perhaps only Jacques Derrida could have been 
over-interpreted by architects because he had this idea of  the 
perennial textuality of  the world, and when he said that the 
future belongs to ghosts, he meant that the future belongs to 
those who have indicated that future, and if  there is some-
one who indicates the future in an arrogant way beyond the 
culture of  the one who then will go to approach this future 
it is the architect, the designer, and so on. For this reason, I 
believe that philosophical architecture, which is the gaining 
of  awareness that when doing architecture you are building 
social reality, you are building the world, you are addressing 
humanity; it is the new outlook of  research. First, there was 
the ethics and then the aesthetics of  architecture done from 
the point of  view of  philosophers; meanwhile, there is no 
doubt that the future of  forms of  life passes to the environ-
ment that we build, and that there is mutual and reciprocal 
assistance between construction and form of  life, because we 
are not only a biological object, but above all social. 
When Foucault says that man is a recent invention, he 
means that the human as we understand it today is an in-
vention of  the social sciences. here is this restructuring of  
the concept and of  philosophy, and the destruction of  the 
place in which man lives is part of  architecture – working 
together is the only option.
